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Hans-Inge Langø 
 
 
 
 
 
Hostile actors in cyberspace are considered one of the fastest growing 
threats to states. Much has been written on the subject, but the availa-
ble literature remains parochial, lacking a unifying understanding of 
the environment. This paper proposes a systematic approach to under-
standing the political utility of cyberspace, specifically the character 
of compulsory cyber power. It does so by conducting an ecological 
analysis of the defining characteristics of cyberspace and its security 
implications. The paper concludes that although cyberspace introduces 
new security dynamics such as significant increases in vulnerabilities 
and a collapse of speed, the compulsory power potential remains lim-
ited. Large-scale, destructive attacks are far more difficult to orches-
trate than what public discourse might suggest. While actors may at-
tack critical infrastructure in new places and with more ease through 
cyberspace than physical sabotage, cyber weapons are primarily dis-
ruptive, rather than destructive, and lack the ability to conquer territo-
ry or accumulate assets.  
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: 
I would like to express my gratitude to my colleagues at NUPI for in-
put and feedback during the course of finishing this paper. In particu-
lar I wish to thank Karsten Friis who has offered guidance and en-
couragement throughout the process. Without his help this paper 
would be in much worse shape. I would also like to thank Dave 
Clemente, Adam Elkus, Matt Fay, Storm Jarl Landaasen, and Tim 
Stevens who read the final draft of this paper and offered helpful ad-
vice both on the subject matter and theoretical issues. Of course all 
mistakes and errors of analysis are mine alone. Finally, I wish to thank 
the Norwegian Ministry of Defense and the Norwegian Cyber Defense 
Command for supporting this research and NUPI’s contribution to the 
MNE7 and MCDC projects. 
Introduction 
“The most destructive scenarios involve cyber actors launching several attacks 
on our critical infrastructure at one time, in combination with a physical attack 
on our country.  Attackers could also seek to disable or degrade critical military 
systems and communication networks.  The collective result of these kinds of at-
tacks could be a “cyber Pearl Harbor:” an attack that would cause physical de-
struction and the loss of life.  In fact, it would paralyze and shock the nation and 
create a new, profound sense of vulnerability.”1 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, New York, October 11, 2012 
 
The notion of a “cyber Pearl Harbor” has been a consistent theme of 
the cyber security discourse for several years.2 The exact meaning of 
the term varies, but it implies some form of complex, large-scale 
cyber attack against the U.S. critical national infrastructure (CNI).3 It 
evokes images of massive destruction and chaos, all instigated by a 
few keystrokes. However, we have yet to see anything close to such a 
doomsday scenario, either in scale or complexity. Why have we not 
yet seen cyber war, or a “cyber Pearl Harbor?” This paper posits that 
such a scenario, used so often to warn of the dangers of our increased 
dependency on information-communications technology (ICT), is em-
blematic of a debate founded on a faulty or incomplete understanding 
of its main object of analysis: cyberspace. This issue is not restricted 
to policy debates in Washington or elsewhere. Many scholars have 
written academic work on the topic of cyber security, dealing with a 
range of issues and taking different approaches, in order to answer the 
central question of how actors can hurt other actors through cyber-
space. However, none have taken a systematic approach to under-
standing the strategic utility of cyberspace.  
 
Instead, the academic debate is often either parochial, focusing on lim-
ited issues such as the definition of war, or fixated on finding com-
monalities with existing forms of military power, usually sea, nuclear 
or air power. These works often take a top-down approach, using ei-
ther empirical data or analogy to generalize about cyberspace, yet both 
approaches have significant shortcomings. The lack of available em-
                                                 
1  Leon E. Panetta, “Defending the Nation from Cyber Attack” (speech given at Business 
Executives for National Security, New York, NY, 2012),  
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1728. 
2  Andrew F. Krepinevich defines a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” as a large-scale cyber attack that 
does not cause debilitating damage, but shocks the United States, much like the original 
attack on Pearl Harbor. See: Andrew F. Krepinevich, Cyber Warfare: A “Nuclear Op-
tion”? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, August 24, 
2012), http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/cyber-warfare-a-nuclear-option/. 
3  For a broader discussion on CNI, see Dave Clemente, Cyber Security and Global Interde-
pendence: What Is Critical? (London: Chatham House, February 2013).14/06/2013 
14:25:00 
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pirical data on cyber conflict renders generalization difficult, while 
comparisons with other forms of power are inevitably flawed due to 
their inherently different natures. This study avoids these problems by 
addressing cyber power, specifically compulsory cyber power, 
through what I will label an ecological analysis. By examining the de-
fining characteristics of cyberspace as an ecological system and its 
security implications, we arrive at a more detailed picture of cyber 
power and its potential role in interstate conflict. The aim of such an 
approach, to borrow the words of Clausewitz, is to achieve a better 
description of the nature of cyberspace as an arena or tool for conflict 
and distinguish this nature from cyberspace’s current character. If the 
conclusions drawn here are sound, we should have a better under-
standing of cyber conflict today, as well as a better understanding of 
where it might go in the future. The primary research question there-
fore becomes: How can states utilize cyberspace to coerce or compel 
its adversaries to achieve political goals?4 
Cyberspace as an ecological system 
An ecological approach to cyberspace means mapping the terrain of 
cyberspace and describing what actions cyberspace either encourages 
or restrains. Several scholars have conducted various forms of envi-
ronmental analysis of cyberspace, and the approach used in this paper 
is synthesized from several of these texts, with the most influential 
being Gregory Rattray’s study of the strategic features of cyberspace.5 
However, the approach used in this paper is different in two respects. 
First, this paper considers the relationship between the technological 
environment and the actors participating in it with the assumption that 
the actors’ behavior can and will affect the landscape. As such, cyber-
space is better understood as a dynamic ecological system than as a 
static landscape.6 Second, it is more comprehensive and systematic in 
analyzing cyberspace as a system by distinguishing between the defin-
                                                 
4  This paper does not propose a formal model for conflict in cyberspace. For that to be pos-
sible, the defining characteristics would have to be better defined and measured, and the 
causal relationships between the characteristics and the implications would have to be bet-
ter tested. This is not possible today given the lack of empirical data on cyber conflict. 
5  Several scholars have done environmental studies of cyberspace, either explicitly or im-
plicitly through the study of cyber power. For examples, see Joseph S. Nye, The Future of 
Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011); Gregory J. Rattray, “An Environmental Ap-
proach to Understanding Cyberpower,” in Cyberpower and National Security, ed. Frank-
lin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 2009), 253–274; Daniel T. Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: 
Defining the Problem,” in Cyberpower and National Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, 
Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 2009), 24–42; David J. Betz and Tim Stevens, Cyberspace and the State: Toward a 
strategy for cyber-power (New York: Routledge, 2011); Martin C. Libicki, Conquest in 
Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
6  “Cyberspace as ‘EcoSpace’,” SENDS, November 5, 2010,  
http://sendsonline.org/2010/11/05/cyberspace-as-ecospace/; Carl Hunt, “The Blogging 
Luddite: The Two-and-a-Half Faces of Cyberspace Security,” SENDS, April 25, 2011, 
http://sendsonline.org/2011/04/30/the-blogging-luddite-the-two-and-a-half-faces-of-
cyberspace-security/. 
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ing characteristics of cyberspace and its security implications. Impli-
cations are the result of the defining characteristics, and so the former 
can, hypothetically, only change if the latter changes first. This dis-
tinction also makes it easier to explain which issues are merely fleet-
ing, based on a particular technology or standard, and which are more 
likely to be permanent characteristics of cyber conflict. Much of the 
existing literature either conflates or confuses the two, so establishing 
these causal relationships has significant importance for both future 
analysis and policy prescriptions.  
 
There are numerous examples of social science literature that examine 
the relationship between actors, institutions and structures, and how 
interaction between these parts causes systemic changes.7 Similar to 
network theory and other approaches studying the relationship be-
tween actors and structures, this paper argues that the structure of cy-
berspace is defined not only by its existing properties but by its rela-
tionship with actors—another variable that is not static, as more actors 
join in the ecosystem. Because a large part of what constitutes cyber-
space today is manmade, and can therefore be changed, the claim that 
cyberspace is an ecological system should not be a difficult notion to 
accept. The more important question is: how does this approach bene-
fit our understanding of cyber power, especially as it relates to the use 
of force, or threats thereof?  
 
If we assume that cyber power is derived from cyberspace itself and 
how an actor uses or manipulates it, the first step to defining cyber 
power is to describe cyberspace itself. This paper posits that cyber-
space has four defining characteristics: it is malleable, virtual, net-
worked and software-centric. All of these characteristics carry security 
implications, some of which feature prominently in the cyber security 
debate, for instance the difficulty of attributing hostile actions to ac-
tors in cyberspace. This is a pervasive feature of cyber conflict, but it 
is not a defining characteristic. Rather, it is the product of the idiosyn-
cratic nature of the Internet made possible by the malleability of cy-
berspace, coupled with its decentralized, networked nature. The defin-
ing characteristics presented here should outline what behavior is en-
couraged in cyberspace and what behavior is not encouraged. In other 
words, we assume that the characteristics of cyberspace, to a certain 
extent, shape actor behavior. This is not to say that the nature of cy-
berspace will or will not encourage conflict, but it might favor some 
types of operations over others. If our assumption is valid, we should 
                                                 
7  Network theory is often used in the study of international political economy, but similar 
approaches to security and conflict could be beneficial. For instance, Aaron Frank has 
used evolutionary theory to explain how revolutions in military affairs affect the interna-
tional system. See Aaron Frank, “Military Revolutions, Evolution, and International Rela-
tions Theory” (presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Conven-
tion 2010, Washington, D.C., 2010). 
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expect certain phenomena to occur, but further testing of the model 
will be necessary.8 While a whole host of behaviors and actions might 
fall under the rubric of cyber security, this paper is primarily interest-
ed in actions that can be taken to achieve political ends. As such, this 
paper is not merely descriptive, but analytical. It seeks to weigh the 
means and ways of cyberspace against political ends—and more spe-
cifically, ends through coercive actions. 
 
This paper comprises three main sections. The first section defines the 
paper’s theoretical approach and thematic scope. It begins with a dis-
cussion of definitions and thematic limitations to define the object of 
analysis, namely cyberspace. This is followed by a brief discussion of 
the existing literature on cyber security, with a particular focus on 
cyber power and ecological analysis. The second section offers my 
analysis of cyberspace through an ecological approach. This section 
discusses each of the four defining characteristics and their security 
implications separately, before synthesizing these observations into a 
general picture of compulsory cyber power. Finally, the third section 
discusses the implications of this ecological model for both theory and 
policy. It also suggests future areas of research, especially research 
questions raised but not answered during the course of this work. 
                                                 
8  While this paper makes the assumption that actor behavior is shaped by the terrain it op-
erates in, this is not the only variable determining actor behavior. Indeed, it is one of 
three, with the other two being the structural (external) environment, often referred to as 
the international system, and the actor’s political (internal) context. Both variables may 
have significant impact on actor behavior in cyberspace, but this paper will only deal with 
the ecological variable. Therefore, addressing the issue of cyber power through an ecolog-
ical analysis will only tell part of the story of cyber conflict. 
 Addressing cyber power 
Instead of limiting the analysis to military operations and warfare, this 
paper will focus on cyber power. This offers a broader perspective of 
the strategic utility of cyberspace, including both civilian and military, 
public and private sectors. Defining cyber power will tell us how 
states can utilize cyberspace for political ends in the same way past 
scholars did so with sea or air power. A good starting point for analy-
sis would be Joseph Nye, Jr.’s definition of cyber power: 
 
“[A] set of resources that relate to the creation, control, and communication of 
electronic and computer-based information--infrastructure, networks, software, 
human skills. This includes not only the Internet of networked computers, but al-
so Intranets, cellular technologies, and space-based communications. Defined 
behaviorally, cyberpower is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through use 
of the electronically interconnected information resources of the cyberdomain. 
Cyberpower can be used to produce preferred outcomes within cyberspace, or it 
can use cyberinstruments to produce preferred outcomes in other domains out-
side cyberspace."9 
 
This is a broad subject, so the discussion in this paper will be limited 
to compulsory cyber power, which David J. Betz and Tim Stevens de-
scribe as “direct coercion by one cyberspace actor in an attempt to 
modify the behaviour and conditions of existence of another.”10 Com-
pulsory cyber power is the focus of most of the current academic and 
policy debates, and by addressing it first the stage is set for discus-
sions of other forms of cyber power.11 
Definitions 
Given the lack of consensus on terminology, precision in terms and 
concepts is imperative when discussing cyber security. This section is 
in no way an exhaustive or definitive overview of the terminology of 
cyber security, but it seeks to articulate and clarify the scope of the 
discussion and analysis that follow below.12 A good place to start is by 
looking at cyberspace itself. Martin C. Libicki has divided cyberspace 
                                                 
9  Nye, The Future of Power, 123. 
10   Betz and Stevens, Cyberspace and the State, 45. 
11  For other forms of cyber power, see ibid., chap. 1. 
12  In addition to describing what is included when discussing cyber conflict, it is important 
to note what is not included. Cyber conflict does not usually include cyber crime, indus-
trial espionage or hacktivism conducted by non-state actors, unless these disparate groups 
are in the employment of states pursuing political goals. While non-state actors may hold 
a relatively stronger position in cyberspace than in traditional environments or domains, 
cyber conflict directly between states and non-state actors remains a minor issue in terms 
of state security. Speculation about cyber terrorism remains precisely that, speculation. 
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into three layers. The physical layer consists of tangible objects like 
wires, routers and servers, while the syntactic layer, often referred to 
as the logical layer, reflects the formation of information and “how the 
various information systems from which cyberspace is built are in-
structed and controlled.”13 The semantic layer “contains the infor-
mation meaningful to humans or connected devices.”14 It is perhaps 
best understood as the cognitive function of cyberspace, bridging man 
and machine, or man and information. It is how information is con-
veyed to users, but it also has a social function when multiple users 
plug in at each end of the network. Computer Network Operations 
(CNO) can exploit all levels.15 Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) 
will likely target the syntactic layer to extract or manipulate infor-
mation, while Computer Network Attacks (CNA) will seek to create 
cognitive effects by manipulating the semantic layer or create kinetic 
effects by controlling the syntactic layer in order to manipulate the 
physical layer. It should be noted that CNE and CNA are not mutually 
exclusive actions. CNA is made possible by first conducting recon-
naissance through CNE to identify the structure and vulnerabilities of 
the targeted network before triggering the attack. As such, intelligence 
gathering, conducted through CNE or more traditional approaches, 
enables CNA. 
 
While the layer model may be relatively uncontroversial, defining cy-
berspace as a whole remains a subject for debate. Depending on the 
perspective, cyberspace can be imagined as a domain, environment or 
merely a loose category of functions.16 Daniel T. Kuehl has described 
cyberspace as "a global domain within the information environment 
whose distinctive and unique character is framed by the use of elec-
tronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, ex-
change, and exploit information via interdependent and interconnected 
networks using information-communication technologies."17 This is a 
commonly used definition of cyberspace, but it is not entirely ade-
quate for this discussion. The term “domain” is usually used in a mili-
tary context, and it is the dominant way of conceptualizing cyberspace 
in most western militaries. It elevates cyberspace to a distinct war-
fighting domain along with the other domains of air, land, sea and 
space. This approach is not without detractors. Libicki has argued that 
calling it a domain is inappropriate because cyberspace as a “thing” 
does not exist. Rather, it is a grouping term that includes a host of as-
                                                 
13  Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare, 8. 
14  Ibid., 9. 
15  Whether this social function constitutes a fourth layer is unresolved. While the cognitive 
effects of CNO are not a significant topic of discussion in this paper, it will treat such ef-
fects as happening in a fourth, social layer. 
16  A fourth definition is the term “infosphere,” of which cyberspace is but a part, used by 
David J. Lonsdale. This definition, however, is too broad and vague to be appropriate for 
meaningful analysis. See: David J. Lonsdale, The Nature of War in the Information Age: 
Clausewitzian Future (New York: Frank Cass, 2004). 
17  Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem,” 28. 
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sets and functions. Furthermore, Libicki argues that treating cyber-
space as a distinct domain ignores its subsidiary role to kinetic opera-
tions.18 
 
The idea that cyberspace is more a function than a terrain is not with-
out merit, at least in military terms when dealing with network-to-
network warfare, but it ignores the wider societal implications of cy-
berspace and ICT integration. When considering cyber power writ 
large it is therefore appropriate to refer to cyberspace as an environ-
ment, as it encompasses society as a whole, including the private sec-
tor and civil society. Furthermore, approaching cyberspace as an envi-
ronment means that we include not just the three primary layers of cy-
berspace as conceptualized by Libicki, but also the fourth social or 
cognitive layer.19 This is important because wielding of cyber power 
will, if successful, have a political effect beyond the mere operational 
effect of disrupting, degrading or destroying computer systems. Fur-
thermore, the dense integration of ICT into society means that any 
cyber warfare or conflict is unlikely to be limited to the governmental 
or military sphere. 
 
Conflict in cyberspace should therefore be analyzed as its own envi-
ronment, and not as a military subset of a larger information environ-
ment. While interstate conflict is likely to remain the predominant 
type of conflict, and the military will retain its predominant position, 
separating the military part of cyberspace from the civilian, and espe-
cially the commercial, parts of cyberspace is both difficult and coun-
terproductive. The line between civilian and military is often blurry in 
cyberspace, and most of the ICT infrastructure is privately owned. 
This means that the military is vulnerable through privately-held in-
frastructure, but must also, in time of war, defend these assets. In addi-
tion, a significant part of the innovation in this field comes from the 
private sector, and often the most talented people work for Google or 
Apple, not the Pentagon. One could argue that the center of gravity of 
U.S. cyber power lies not at Fort Meade, headquarters of the U.S. 
Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and the National Security Agen-
cy (NSA), but in Silicon Valley in California or the many DNS serv-
ers across the country.20 
 
                                                 
18 Martin C. Libicki, “Cyberspace Is Not a War-Fighting Domain,” I/S: A Journal of Law 
and Policy for the Information Age 8, no. 2 (2012): 321–336. 
19  In his work Libicki mentions a possible fourth, pragmatic layer of cyberspace. This layer 
would deal with a statement’s “purpose when considered in a particular context.” This 
contextual understanding of information can be important, but Libicki’s concept does not 
deal with the social effects of cyberspace. See Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace: National 
Security and Information Warfare, 237. 
20  Interview with Jason Healey, Washington, DC, June 2012. 
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Cyber war and cyber conflict 
 The term “cyber operations” usually denotes actions undertaken 
through cyberspace. While kinetic attacks or sabotage against physical 
infrastructure can cause effects in cyberspace by disrupting communi-
cations between parties or access to servers, such actions are not con-
sidered part of the field of cyber security. However, cyber security 
does include actions undertaken through cyberspace to influence phys-
ical or organizational processes. An example of the former is Stuxnet, 
while the latter could be a CNA on a government network meant to 
disrupt, degrade or destroy the command and control structure. CNO 
can also have cognitive effects on the operations’ targets. This can be 
achieved by manipulating an opponent’s decision-making process, 
usually through the form of deception or disruption. 
 
Determining exactly what level of destruction or disruption is possible 
through cyberspace is still an ongoing discussion. Scholars have 
coined the term Strategic Information Warfare (SIW) as a way of 
waging cyber warfare on the strategic level, causing independently 
decisive effects on a target through the use of CNO.21 While the via-
bility of SIW as a tool of cyber power is contested, that has not kept 
policymakers and analysts from adopting the general idea in order to 
warn against the dangers of cyber war.22 However, using the term 
cyber war is both conceptually and empirically wrong. Cyber war im-
plies a war between actors that takes place solely in cyberspace, but 
this is a highly unlikely possibility, at least in the foreseeable future, 
for two reasons. First, the notion of cyber war ignores the likelihood 
of escalation into kinetic operations and exaggerates actors’ willing-
ness to contain conflicts to cyberspace.23 Second, it ignores the re-
                                                 
21  For a broader discussion on SIW, see: Roger C. Molander, Andrew Riddile, and Peter A. 
Wilson, Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War (Santa Monica, California: 
RAND Corporation, 1996), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR661.html; 
Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press, 2001). 
22  The term cyber war is frequently misused by policymakers, scholars and news organiza-
tions, using it to describe a wide range of activities from espionage to military operations 
part of a larger conflict. For examples, see John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar 
Is Coming!,” in In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, ed. 
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1997), 
23–60; Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National 
Security and What to Do About It (New York: Ecco, 2010); Mike McConnell, “Mike 
McConnell on how to win the cyber-war we’re losing,” Washington Post, February 28, 
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502493.html; John D. Sutter, “Anonymous 
Declares ‘Cyberwar’ on Israel,” CNN.com, November 20, 2012, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/19/tech/web/cyber-attack-israel-anonymous/index.html. 
23  Several scholars have criticized the use of the term cyber war, specifically the idea of 
stand-alone cyber war. See Lonsdale, The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clause-
witzian Future; Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Wei-
denfeld & Nicolson, 2005); Jean-Loup Samaan, “Cyber Command: The Rift in US Mili-
tary Cyber-Strategy,” The RUSI Journal 155, no. 6 (2010): 16–21; Sean Lawson, Beyond 
Cyber-Doom: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History, Working paper (Fair-
fax: Mercatus Center, January 2011); Erik Gartzke, The Myth of Cyberwar, Working pa-
per, December 7, 2012; Sean Lawson, “Putting the ‘War’ in Cyberwar: Metaphor, Analo-
gy, and Cybersecurity Discourse in the United States,” First Monday 17, no. 7 (July 2, 
2012), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3848/3270; 
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quirement that actions in cyberspace must reach decisive political 
ends for it to be able to stand alone as a use of force.24 
 
A broader, more appropriate term for military operations in cyber-
space is cyber warfare, which means conducting CNO as part of a 
larger war or conflict. This means that cyber operations are not a sub-
stitute for regular military operations, but rather as one aspect of a 
larger military conflict. Still, the term cyber warfare is almost exclu-
sively focused on military operations, with proxy forces only a mar-
ginal concern, and does not fully take into account the broader societal 
aspect of cyber security. Furthermore, it is not a term appropriate for 
use in peacetime, which is when a lot of malicious activity in cyber-
space takes place. A more comprehensive term would then be cyber 
conflict.25 This term encompasses all manners of hostile actions taken 
in cyberspace, ranging from direct CNA against opponents in wartime 
to covert operations and espionage. 
 
As for what specific operations fall under compulsory cyber conflict, 
there is a wide range of possibilities, with the most relevant being 
CNA against infrastructure and command and control systems. CNE 
could also be used to the extent that espionage can be exploited for 
compellence purposes, but would most probably only work in a sup-
porting role. CNA can mean directly disruptive, degrading or destruc-
tive attacks. Operations aimed at subversion or manipulation of a tar-
get population can also have effects, though it is unclear whether it 
would work as a form of coercion or compellence. It is not a new phe-
nomenon, though society-wide integration of ICT can provide signifi-
cant economies of scale. 26 
Competing ideas 
As a recognizable security practice, cyber security is still in its nascent 
stage. It is not surprising, therefore, that the academic field of cyber 
security is still quite young. We can trace discussions of information 
warfare, a broader term that encompasses much of the ideas of CNO 
prevalent today, at least back to the 1970s. However, most of the sig-
nificant academic contributions to the field have been published more 
                                                 
Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 
(2012): 5–32. 
24  Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place.” 
25  For a broader discussion on cyber conflict, see Athina Karatzogianni, The Politics of Cy-
berconflict, Routledge Research on Internet and Society (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006); Athina Karatzogianni, ed., Cyber Conflict and Global Politics, 
Routledge Contemporary Security Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 2009). 
26  These are the main categories of cyber warfare, but there are several other types of opera-
tions under the broader concept of information warfare, some relevant to cyber power. For 
more information, see: Martin C. Libicki, What Is Information Warfare? (Washington, 
D.C.: National Defense University, 1995). 
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or less in the past two decades.27 While there is much written now on 
cyber security, it remains a fragmented field of disparate approaches 
and conceptual thinking.28 These approaches can offer significant elu-
cidation of certain questions, but are often too parochial or based on 
concepts of other forms of power to be used for comprehensive analy-
sis. For instance, the foundational writings of John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt in the 1990s articulated the impact the information revolu-
tion could have on warfare and even societal conflict. 29 More specifi-
cally, information was treated as a material asset, and they posited that 
information dominance through organizational superiority could be 
translated into battlefield victory. 30 However, their work does not ad-
equately, or realistically for that matter, describe how actors can ex-
ploit cyberspace vulnerabilities, specifically in a civilian setting. Their 
work is as much about organization and doctrine as it is about cyber-
space as a strategic environment. As such, it is more appropriate for 
military planning than for examining cyber power in a larger setting. 
 
Another important, yet flawed, component of the cyber security litera-
ture is the work surrounding SIW. As an idea, SIW has laid the foun-
dation for many scholars’ take on cyber power. Usually this has come 
in the form of comparative analyses, comparing cyberspace with other 
domains or powers, such as air power or even nuclear power. While 
the use of analogies can be helpful in highlighting differences, too of-
ten it is used to show how cyber power can resemble air power or why 
cyberspace is similar to the maritime domain because they share some 
commonalities; for instance, they both have chokepoints of sorts.31 
This is an inherently flawed approach as it inevitably runs the risk of 
shoehorning something new into an old analytical framework.32 This, 
in turn, leads to conceptual and terminological confusion. Further-
more, such a top-down approach to the study of cyberspace is not 
                                                 
27  For an early example of Pentagon thinking on information warfare, see Thomas P. Rona, 
“Weapon Systems and Information War” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 
1976). For an historical overview of information warfare in the U.S. military, see Bruce 
D. Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century (New 
York: Free Press, 2003), chap. 4 and 6. 
28  For a broader discussion on the literature of cyber security, see Hans-Inge Langø, “Den 
Akademiske Debatten Om Cybersikkerhet,” Internasjonal Politikk 71, no. 2 (May 2013): 
229–240. 
29  Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s concept of ‘netwar’, information-based conflict on a societal lev-
el, will be discussed towards the end of this paper. A collection of their most important 
works can be found in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., In Athena’s Camp: Pre-
paring for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corpora-
tion, 1997). 
30  Libicki has written similarly on using information superiority through the use of sensors 
to control the battlefield. See Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on 
Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Universi-
ty, March 1994), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA278484&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
31  For examples of scholarly use of analogies in regards to cyber security, see: Rattray, Stra-
tegic Warfare in Cyberspace; Rattray, “An Environmental Approach to Understanding 
Cyberpower”; Krepinevich, Cyber Warfare: A “Nuclear Option”?; Kuehl, “From Cyber-
space to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem.” 
32  Samaan, “Cyber Command: The Rift in US Military Cyber-Strategy.” 
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conducive to examining the nature of the environment as it means 
studying particular trends or transient phenomena observed at the time 
of the analysis rather than the defining characteristics of cyberspace. 
 
More recent work on cyber security has done a better job of defining 
the character of cyberspace, or more specifically cyber conflict. 
Scholars such as Thomas Rid and David J. Lonsdale have made per-
suasive arguments that delineate the limits of strategic cyber power, or 
SIW.33 For instance, Rid argues that cyberspace is not conducive to 
fighting wars, but more appropriate for sabotage, espionage and sub-
version.34 This traditionalist approach has helped cool the cyber hype 
and offered a more tempered take on the challenges ahead. However, 
this approach remains insufficient for structured analysis of compulso-
ry cyber power. First, it is overly focused on violence as a necessary 
component of warfare, dismissing the disruptive potential of cyber 
warfare.35 As societies grow more dependent on ICT, so does the 
number of vulnerabilities, thus potentially making compulsory cyber 
power more tenable than the traditionalists claim. Second, the empiri-
cal approach to cyber security is inherently flawed because the availa-
ble data is simply insufficient to generalize about the security implica-
tions of cyberspace. While the lack of large-scale cyber attacks so far 
could be used as an argument against SIW, as Rid does, this ignores 
the reality that most actors are still grappling with the security impli-
cations of cyberspace. Specifically, states are still trying to figure out 
whether they can hurt or be hurt through cyberspace. While Rid may 
be proven right, it is far too early to conclude on the potential for 
cyber warfare. 
 
Other scholars have attempted a more systematic and holistic ap-
proach to the study of cyberspace. Appropriately, these scholars often 
focus on power, but their work is better defined by its analytical ap-
proach, namely the environmental analysis of cyberspace. The ‘envi-
ronmentalist’ approach entails examining cyberspace as a whole, be it 
an environment or a domain, to define its key characteristics or strate-
gic features.36 For instance, when Joseph Nye, Jr. attempts to define 
cyber power, he uses an environment analysis to describe its charac-
ter.37 Nye’s main focus is the diffusion of power occurring in cyber-
space, while others focus on different characteristics. Libicki indirect-
                                                 
33  Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place”; Lonsdale, The Nature of War in the Information 
Age: Clausewitzian Future. 
34  Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place.” 
35  While Rid defines violence as a requirement for war, other scholars argue that states can 
use force without bloodshed and still achieve political goals. See: Gray, Another Bloody 
Century: Future Warfare, 293–294; Phillip S. Meilinger, “The Mutable Nature of War,” 
Air & Space Power Journal 24, no. 4 (2010): 24–30; John Stone, “Cyber War Will Take 
Place!,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 1 (2013): 101–108. 
36  There are various terms used in the literature, but they mean essentially the same thing. 
This discussion will use the former term, whereas Gregory J. Rattray uses the latter in his 
writing.  
37  Nye, The Future of Power, chap. 5. 
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ly addresses compulsory cyber power in his work on deterrence and 
conquest in cyberspace, while Rattray approximates a systematic 
analysis of cyberspace’s “strategic features” in a 2009 book chapter 
appropriately called “An Environmental Approach to Understanding 
Cyberpower.”38 
 
All of these works inform our discussion about particular characteris-
tics or phenomena, but are not systematic enough to serve as a founda-
tional framework of analysis. Nye’s work is not broad enough and 
does not directly address the security implications of the diffusion of 
technology, while Libicki focuses more on function than form. The 
point here is not to detract from their outstanding work, but to show 
the limits of its broader applicability to compulsory cyber power. Rat-
tray’s work is more systematic, but as with other texts discussing what 
makes cyberspace unique or distinct, does not adequately address the 
distinction between defining characteristics and their security implica-
tions. Examining existing theories of power (land, sea, air and space), 
he identified four common features: technological advances, speed 
and scope of operations, control of key features and national mobiliza-
tion.39 Though these are all valid observations, he mistakenly groups 
them together in a single category of “strategic features.” Technologi-
cal advances and speed are defining characteristics, but control of key 
features is a way of achieving strategic ends. Likewise, national mobi-
lization is the implication of power diffusion and the networked space, 
and not a characteristic in and of itself. Despite their shortcomings, 
though, it is clear that the ‘environmentalist’ school of thought is the 
most appropriate starting point for an analysis of cyberspace as a stra-
tegic environment. 
                                                 
38  Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare; Martin C. 
Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 
2009); Rattray, “An Environmental Approach to Understanding Cyberpower.” 
39  Rattray, “An Environmental Approach to Understanding Cyberpower,” 262. 
An ecological approach 
Much of the existing cyber security literature offers observations on 
what separates cyberspace from other domains or environments. Its 
uniqueness is often highlighted in order to justify the development of 
new theories or concepts of security. Precisely how unique cyberspace 
is lies beyond the scope of this paper, but it is commonly accepted 
among scholars that the environment holds some distinct properties. 
Scholars often list a number of characteristics that shape the threat en-
vironment, but these lists differ from scholar to scholar as some focus 
on a particular aspect of cyberspace while others focus on a specific 
threat or method. There is no authoritative list of the defining features 
of cyberspace, but based on an extensive reading of the literature, in 
addition to conversations with a wide range of scholars and practition-
ers, a comprehensive list of commonly accepted features would in-
clude: collapse of space and time, no conquerable ground, lack of 
warning of attacks, the difficulty in attributing actions to actors, a con-
stantly changing and evolving battlefield, democratization of technol-
ogy and a low cost of entry.40 
 
All of these so-called features can have an impact on security and ac-
tor behavior, but calling them characteristics or properties of cyber-
space is imprecise. They are the implications of more fundamental 
characteristics of cyberspace. In other words, they are dependent vari-
ables. This paper proposes that there are, roughly speaking, four defin-
ing characteristics of cyberspace, and each of these has a set of securi-
ty implications, with all of the above included. Making this distinction 
between characteristics and implications is important, because it 
means the latter can and most likely will change if the former changes. 
The four defining characteristics of cyberspace are those of being mal-
leable, virtual, decentralized (flat and networked) and software-
centric. 
A Malleable Terrain 
Cyberspace is a manmade environment. While the electromagnetic 
spectrum is not, cyberspace as it exists today consists of hardware and 
software built and designed by people. The different layers of cyber-
                                                 
40  Conversations with scholars and practitioners have taken place primarily through the 
work with Multinational Experiment 7, a multinational concept development and experi-
mentation campaign led by the U.S. Joint Staff with participants from 16 other countries 
and NATO ACT, focused on access to the global commons, of which cyberspace was a 
subject of study. The author represented Norway in this campaign from March 2011 to 
December 2012. 
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space are a result of this construction, be it deliberate or through a 
form of natural selection where some inventions become standard 
while others fall by the wayside. This means that the content and 
character of the various layers can be altered. New technologies to 
transmit signals might be invented, while new protocols and software 
for the syntactic layer are constantly amended or replaced. The layers 
of cyberspace, however, are seemingly set. While the protocols of the 
syntactic layer might change, as with the introduction of Internet Pro-
tocol version 6 (IPv6), there will always be a physical layer under-
neath it and a semantic layer above it. This is not to say that technical 
changes in cyberspace are themselves unlikely, merely that there are 
some ‘laws of physics’ governing the development in this environ-
ment. We can call this feature ‘vertical malleability.’ 
 
The other kind, ‘horizontal malleability,’ implies a change in how 
humans and society relate to cyberspace.41 The two features may in-
teract, but for the sake of clarity it is best to address them separately in 
this discussion. Horizontal malleability refers first and foremost to two 
processes: increased integration of ICT in society (quantity), and tech-
nology being used in new ways (quality), even changing the users 
themselves in the process. In short, this means that individuals, organ-
izations and society are becoming increasingly dependent on cyber-
space, for both old and new functions. 
 
Both forms of malleability have implications for security. Attributing 
malicious behavior in cyberspace, especially on the Internet, to specif-
ic actors is a widely referenced problem area in cyber security. The 
problem exists because of the way the Internet is built. It is easy to 
conceal the origin of a CNO because of the lack of a robust verifica-
tion system and the ease with which one can reroute traffic through 
unsuspecting servers elsewhere. The attribution issue in cyberspace is 
an idiosyncratic property of the Internet, and therefore the result of 
vertical malleability. 
 
Furthermore, efforts to ‘fix’ the attribution problem illustrate that se-
curity implications do not remain static. The Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), which develops and promotes Internet standards, 
has developed IPv6, a new communications protocol that will replace 
the existing and dominating IPv4. IPv6 purports to fix the problem 
with attribution, or at least reduce it, by making packets of data easier 
to trace back to their origins. Whether this will actually happen is un-
certain. In fact, the implementation of IPv6 might instead lead to new 
                                                 
41  Society is meant to include not just the public and private sector, but civil society as well. 
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vulnerabilities.42 Nonetheless, it is an example of how vertical mallea-
bility can impact security. 
 
Horizontal malleability is characterized by increased dependence on 
cyberspace. Given the nature of cyberspace, this almost inevitably 
means increased vulnerabilities. New software often means new vul-
nerabilities, and expanded use of ICT means new vulnerabilities in 
new places. From a defensive perspective, particularly on the state 
level, this means that the battleground is in flux and that the perimeter 
is in constant expansion. The increased focus on critical infrastructure 
protection amongst many states suggests that governments and offi-
cials share this perception, though not all cyberspace-dependent func-
tions in society are included in critical infrastructure protection. Un-
certainty in matters of vulnerability and dependence lies at the heart of 
cyber policy efforts in the United States, the EU and other countries, 
so much so that the traditional risk and threat analysis approach is be-
ing at least partially replaced by a focus on resilience.43 This new ap-
proach does not set aside calculations of risk or threats, but is based on 
the assumption that conducting a proper risk assessment is near im-
possible because it is not feasible to assess the full scope of one’s vul-
nerabilities. They are so plentiful and unpredictable that both states 
and organizations base their cyber defense on the assumption that their 
networks will be penetrated or attacked.44 This acquiescence of risk is 
then coupled with an effort to build up resilience, which, simply put, 
means the ability to absorb malicious actions and recover.  
 
The malleability of cyberspace is perhaps the most amenable of the 
defining characteristics. Both the vertical and horizontal dimensions 
are constantly changing, and so it is also the most influential of the 
four characteristics. By definition it can change the other defining 
characteristics, and also dictate what cyber security means by its abil-
ity to change or expand cyberspace as an ecological system. The most 
obvious implication for policy is the persistent presence of uncertain-
ty; vulnerabilities are by definition unknown and the threat landscape 
is dynamic. This is not to say that threats are unknown, as cyberspace 
does not create new hostile actors, but introduces new ways for them 
to assert power. 
                                                 
42  Atik Pilihanto, A Complete Guide on IPv6 Attack and Defense (Bethesda, Maryland: 
SANS Institute, November 14, 2011). 
43  This observation is based on the work developing a threats and vulnerabilities methodolo-
gy for cyberspace through MNE7. 
44  This is based on the author’s numerous conversations with cyber security practitioners 
and officials both in the public and private sector, in Norway and across Europe. 
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A virtual realm 
Cyberspace is often described as a virtual or non-physical domain. 
This is not entirely accurate. Cyberspace is dependent on a physical 
layer to function, but a significant part of what constitutes cyberspace 
is virtual. The physical assets of cyberspace, like processors, wires 
and routers, permit the storage, modification, exchange and exploita-
tion of information, but these processes are governed by what is com-
monly referred to as the syntactic or logical layer. The resulting in-
formation then exists in the semantic layer where users, human or oth-
erwise, can access it.45 
 
The reason why these layers and processes are usually referred to as 
‘virtual’ is a question of scale. The information in cyberspace is not 
non-physical. It is stored on physical devices and exchanged through 
signaling, a process which involves real electrons. But because of the 
dramatic development in computer technology over the past half-
decade, information can be stored or transmitted at remarkable speeds 
and in vast quantities. Gordon E. Moore predicted in 1965 that the 
number of transistors on integrated circuits would double approxi-
mately every two years, and this has turned out to be a prophetic 
statement of significant accuracy.46 The processing speed of comput-
ers has increased exponentially for quite some time, and aided by fiber 
optics, networked environments like the Internet, communication has 
reached previously unimagined velocity in creating and sending in-
formation. 
 
The immediate security implication of this virtual realm is the collapse 
of space and time. The collapse of space is only meant metaphorically; 
increased computing power and fast transfer methods mean that phys-
ical distance between the attacker and the defender is close to irrele-
vant as an operational issue. This is obvious with Chinese individuals 
or organizations penetrating U.S. government networks and U.S. 
agencies conducting large-scale CNE in the Middle East, but these 
countries already possessed the ability to project force or assets across 
large distances before the advent of cyberspace. It is the equivalent of 
dropping paratroopers behind enemy lines, except that you are using 
commercial airplanes to do it, at network speed. Cyberspace makes 
this easier, but in reference to Nye’s concept of power diffusion, the 
substantive change is that more actors can do it, and not just states. 
The rise of hacktivist groups such as Anonymous illustrates the bor-
derlessness of cyberspace by being able to launch DDoS attacks 
                                                 
45  Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare, chap. 10. 
46  Gordon E. Moore, “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,” Electronics 
38, no. 8 (April 19, 1965). 
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against a wide range of targets from thousands of computers spread 
across several continents.47 
 
The strategic implication of the collapse of distance is similar. Geog-
raphy matters less than with conventional coercive tools, and it is eas-
ier to hold a distant opponent’s assets at risk. Whereas traditional 
force projection or covert operations would run the risk of alerting an 
opponent beforehand, offensive cyber operations can leap across the 
map. This means most states can potentially have new coercive tools. 
Today, the United States is the only state with significant force-
projection capability, but depending on the coercive utility of cyber-
space, more states will be capable of limited force-projection. What 
impact such a development—a development that is contingent on 
more sophisticated cyber weapons and continued societal vulnerability 
related to cyberspace—will have on international security is unclear, 
but this will be further discussed in the final section of this paper. 
 
The collapse of both speed and distance means that CNOs seem to 
happen instantaneously. Targeted states or organizations are usually 
given little or no advance warning, enabling sneak attacks. Rapid at-
tacks in cyberspace have been compared to the German blitzkrieg doc-
trine, but setting aside the discussion over the destructive potential of 
cyber weapons, there are important distinctions between tank warfare 
and cyber warfare. Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that cyber warfare de-
pends less on geographic terrain and having to rapidly penetrate an 
opponent’s defensive line, and more on controlling the cyberspace en-
vironment. They write, “Cyberwar may require speedy flows of in-
formation and communications, but not necessarily a speedy or heavi-
ly armed offense like blitzkrieg. If the opponent is blinded, it can do 
little against even a slow-moving adversary.”48 This is similar to the 
idea of blitzkrieg serving as a form of strategic penetration, finding a 
weak point in the defensive line to strike at the nervous system of the 
opponent’s military.49 
 
The difference highlighted is important, but Arquilla and Ronfeldt in-
accurately infer from this an advantage over blitzkrieg. Debilitating 
CNAs against communications or command and control systems can 
                                                 
47 Saki Knafo, “Anonymous And The War Over The Internet,” Huffington Post, January 30, 
2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/30/anonymous-internet-
war_n_1233977.html; Saki Knafo, “Anonymous And The War Over The Internet (Part 
II),” Huffington Post, January 31, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/31/anonymous-war-over-
internet_n_1237058.html?ncid=edlinkusaolp00000003; Quinn Norton, “How Anonymous 
Picks Targets, Launches Attacks, and Takes Powerful Organizations Down,” Threat Lev-
el, July 3, 2012, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/07/ff_anonymous/all/; Quinn 
Norton, “Anonymous 101: Introduction to the Lulz,” Threat Level, November 8, 2011, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/11/anonymous-101/all/1. 
48  Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!,” 44. 
49  John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 
36. 
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‘blind’ an opponent, but territorial maneuvering has significant ad-
vantages. Whereas German tank divisions were able to advance after 
taking out a target, cyber weapons do not work that way. Cyber weap-
ons by design exploit vulnerabilities in an opponent’s network. Once 
that vulnerability has been exploited to gain access to or cripple a sys-
tem, that weapon has been spent. Instead of being like a tank, a cyber 
weapon is like a single-shot rifle, or as Thomas Rid and Peter McBur-
ney put it, “the proverbial fire-and-forget missile.”50 Furthermore, if 
the CNA does not destroy or adequately degrade the targeted network, 
system administrators will eventually be able to reboot the network, 
meaning the attacker will have to keep firing. According to Adam 
Elkus, cyber weapons are better suited for cumulative effects, rather 
than sequential effects. Instead of utilizing “force in discrete, linear 
packages,” a cumulative strategy using cyber weapons will “build 
gradual and nonlinear pressure on an opponent.”51 A cumulative strat-
egy would then negate the possible gains from a surprise attack, alert-
ing the opponent to the attack and enabling them to respond without a 
crippling first strike. 
 
Cyber weapons also do not have the ability to dislocate its opponents, 
a key feature of blitzkrieg, according to Barry Posen.52 The lack of 
territory in cyberspace to conquer and hold creates opportunities, but 
also limits the benefits of the offense. This issue will be discussed to a 
greater extent later under the rubric of cyberspace as a networked en-
vironment, but has significant implications for the issue of speed and 
space as well. 
 
The limitations on surprise attacks mean the increase in speed only 
yields a limited first-move advantage.53 On a strategic level, this has 
certain implications. Theoretically, states can mobilize without detec-
tion and attack faster than with kinetic strikes, but a digital blitzkrieg 
would necessitate cyber weapons much more sophisticated than what 
has been demonstrated today, in addition to a much larger organiza-
tional capacity for cyber warfare. Several states are seeking to in-
crease their capacity, though little is known about their actual capa-
bilities, particularly those related to offensive operations.54 
                                                 
50  Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney, “Cyber-Weapons,” RUSI Journal 157, no. 1 (2012): 9. 
51  Adam Elkus, “Cyber Warfare...Brought To You By J.C. Wylie,” Information Dissemina-
tion, May 31, 2012, http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/05/cyber-
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52  Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Be-
tween the World Wars (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), 86. 
53  For a broader discussion of first-move advantage in international relations theory, see 
Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999). 
54  The conclusion that little is made public about states’ offensive capabilities is based on 
the author’s own observations following developments in cyber security over the past two 
years. For examples of countries actively pursuing offensive capabilities, see Gerard 
O’Dwyer, “Finland To Develop Cyber Defense ‘Counterpunch’,” DefenseNews, October 
20, 2011, 
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In summary, the collapse of space and time in cyberspace has several 
implications for security. It eases, or erases entirely, the constraint of 
geography on offensive actions in cyberspace, and enables actors to 
launch CNOs with little to no notice. However, given the nature of 
cyber tools, large-scale attacks are difficult to achieve, and achieving 
lasting effects may be even harder. Since advanced cyber weapons 
usually only have single-shot usage, an attacker must continue to hit a 
target to achieve a cumulative effect, thus reducing the element of 
surprise and first-move advantage. In practical terms, this would sug-
gest that an actor would need significant resources to conduct and 
maintain operations to a high enough level and for a long enough pe-
riod of time to reach political goals. 
A Networked Space 
Calling cyberspace a networked space has several meanings and im-
plications. It means the environment is open and connectable. Be it the 
Internet or cyberspace, just about anyone can connect using readily 
available technology. This also means cyberspace is decentralized.  
With the exception of some organizations that govern standards and 
protocols, there is no central authority that controls entry or usage. It 
is a network of networks. Combined, this means cyberspace is com-
plex, with a large number of users ungoverned and largely unchecked. 
The implication of this networked complexity and interdependence is 
that it is practically difficult to limit the effects of cyber attacks to one 
particular country or region. Defining the exact structure of cyber-
space is seemingly impossible, as it is more a concept than a cohesive, 
coherent structure, but some attempts have been made at examining 
the Internet, which can serve as an example for how networks within 
cyberspace work. 
 
A 2007 study of the nodes that make up the Internet found that there 
are three subcomponents of the Internet: at the core is a small nucleus 
consisting of around 100 nodes, and around it is a fractal subcompo-
nent consisting of around 15,000 nodes that can connect to the bulk of 
the Internet without congesting the nucleus.55 The third subcomponent 
                                                 
Develop-Cyber-Defense-Counterpunch-; Michael Fischer, Joerg Blank, and Christoph 
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consists of around 5,000 isolated nodes that connect directly to the 
nucleus. By mapping and testing the relationship between the nodes 
and subcomponents, the researchers found that without the nucleus 
around 70% of the peer-connected nodes (the second subcomponent) 
remained connected. This suggests that while the nucleus is important 
for achieving full connectivity, the Internet is decentralized and ro-
bust. 
 
Despite its decentralized nature, the Internet is not devoid of weak 
points. As opposed to scaled networks, where each node has roughly 
the same amount of connections, nodes in scale-free networks have a 
varying number of connections. Some have only one, like the third 
subcomponent discussed above, while others have many, like the In-
ternet nucleus. The Internet is a scale-free network, and this has an 
impact on security. Studies of Internet resilience have shown that 
scale-free networks are more resilient to errors and failure than scaled 
networks. However, this robustness comes at a cost. Because some 
nodes have significantly more connections than others (i.e. the nucle-
us), intentional attacks aimed at those nodes can fragment and impair 
the network, making the Internet vulnerable to actors seeking to dis-
rupt or degrade the network.56 
 
The notion of weak points in cyberspace has obvious parallels to other 
subfields within international security. While sea power can mean the 
ability to control sea lanes and chokepoints, a comparable analogy in 
cyberspace would be the control of key points in the ICT infrastruc-
ture. Cyber power, like sea power, is about controlling the terrain to 
produce preferred outcomes.57 The chokepoints in terms of cyber-
space, according to Gregory J. Rattray, “include the physical infra-
structures that enable communications, such as undersea fiber optic 
cables and communications satellites, and major interconnection 
points for large global networks.”58 However, the analogy to sea pow-
er is flawed. These key bits of infrastructure, given their relatively 
small number, are chokepoints but cannot be controlled in the same 
way a fleet controls a narrow strait. Undersea cables cannot be the 
subjects of a blockade, and while satellites and key nodes can be con-
trolled or destroyed, the issue of interdependence is difficult to cir-
cumvent. While technically feasible, it appears difficult to limit the 
effects of a chokepoint operation to a given geographical area. Cyber-
space is not divided into regions; its parts are interwoven across bor-
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ders and not easily disentangled.59 Only an irrational or desperate ac-
tor would destroy a chokepoint because the internal costs would likely 
be substantial. Shutting off the Internet in one target country would 
likely mean affecting Internet access in neighboring countries, perhaps 
even including the attacking country. This high level of interdepend-
ence makes any strike on the key parts of the physical layer of the In-
ternet highly risky. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the territory of cyberspace is intangible.  In the 
same way that it is impossible to blockade an undersea cable without 
physically controlling it, it is also not possible to conquer networks. 
They can be remotely accessed and controlled, but all the system ad-
ministrator has to do in response is to cut the power or sever the exter-
nal link. Without physical assets, it is not possible to accumulate terri-
tory in cyberspace overtly. This lack of conquerable land likely means 
that CNOs have to have either destructive or degrading effects on the 
networks for them to have tangible effects outside of cyberspace. Dis-
ruptive attacks will have only fleeting effects, which are of limited use 
unless used in support of operations in other domains, enabling physi-
cal gains.  
 
Attacking the chokepoints of the Internet is not the same as striking 
the physical layer of closed networks, and differentiating between the 
two is important for conceptual clarity and security implications. The 
key differences are ways of access and issues of containment. Militar-
ies usually use closed networks for classified information and com-
munication. Communications networks are likely encrypted (theoreti-
cally these can be broken, but it would require computing power few, 
if any, countries possess or inside knowledge of the cryptosystem it-
self to enable so-called side channel attacks), while information pro-
cessing networks can be restricted to a physical location, like a base, 
and air-gapped. The latter means there is no connection to outside 
networks, such as the Internet. There are also semi-closed networks 
that have access and authentication measures in place to keep unwant-
ed visitors out, and these are the most common targets for CNE, or 
cyber espionage. Currently, the only way to access a closed network is 
to gain physical access to the facility itself. This was done in the case 
of Stuxnet, where a USB thumb drive carrying the malware made its 
way to a computer connected to the network at the Natanz enrichment 
facility.60 Such an operation requires an insider or covert operations 
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capabilities. While this makes it harder to gain access, it should theo-
retically also keep the malware, or any effects of the malware, from 
spreading. This is often not the case, as many perceivably closed net-
works have some vulnerabilities; for instance, the air gap can be 
jumped backwards by someone taking material out of the facility and 
inserting it into open networks. Allegedly, the subsequent spread of 
Stuxnet was a case of the latter as an Iranian scientist brought the in-
fected USB thumb drive home and plugged it into a computer con-
nected to the Internet, though that particular version has been disput-
ed.61 
 
The spread of other complex malware, such as Flame and Duqu, sug-
gests that these cyber tools are not accurate or easily contained. While 
this can be inferred to be based on flaws in the programming of the 
malware, it is not inconceivable that the nature of cyberspace and 
modern computing is so complex that unintended consequences are 
inevitable. The lack of predictability might be the best explanation as 
to why there have been so few CNAs like Stuxnet and no attacks on 
physical ICT infrastructure. The uncertainty is not limited to cyber-
space either. Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. military debat-
ed launching CNOs against the Iraqi banking system. Causing an eco-
nomic crisis and panic could soften the battlefield, but the United 
States eventually decided against the idea due to fears that the effects 
could spread throughout the region and even to Europe.62 Similarly, 
the spread of Stuxnet and other malware has led to concerns over 
cyber proliferation, with some noting that cyber weapons used by the 
United States can potentially be adopted and used against the United 
States.63 
 
Whatever uncertainty may arise from specific pieces of programming, 
the networked nature of cyberspace suggests an inherently interde-
pendent environment where actions are neither easily contained nor 
predicted. As such, the networked nature of cyberspace means it is 
difficult to achieve both a comprehensive situational awareness of the 
system and precise, contained attacks. The unintended consequences 
of cyber weapons appear to be potentially significant, as the ground 
itself is dynamic and the tools used can be difficult to control. 
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Software and Power Diffusion 
The explosive growth in computing power has not just collapsed 
speed and distance; these technological advances, coupled with econ-
omies of scale, have made computing power cheaper. This, in turn, 
has made personal computers practically ubiquitous, at least in the de-
veloped world, enabling access to computing power that just a few 
decades ago was reserved for governments and corporations. Some-
thing similar has happened in terms of speed of communication. Nye 
argues that, “[t]he key characteristic of this Information Revolution is 
not the speed of communications between the wealthy and powerful: 
for more than 130 years, instantaneous communication by telegraph 
has been possible between Europe and North America. The crucial 
change is the enormous reduction in the cost of transmitting infor-
mation.”64 
 
While there have been enormous technological breakthroughs, as dis-
cussed earlier, the societal impact would likely not have been possible 
without the economy-of-scale effect that ensured diffusion of personal 
computing technology. This is what Nye refers to when he talks about 
power diffusion in cyberspace, and it is often characterized by cyber 
security scholars as enabling a relatively low barrier to entry for state 
and non-state actors. In short, this means that obtaining power in cy-
berspace is comparably cheaper than in traditional domains, such as 
air and sea. It is much cheaper to design malware and launch CNOs 
than acquire physical assets like fighter jets and destroyers that come 
with substantial costs and require access to highly advanced technolo-
gy. The security implication of this has been portrayed as that of  mak-
ing rogue nations, or even individuals, capable of waging cyberwar 
with very low costs, but this is incorrect and misses the genuine char-
acter and limitations of the technological diffusion.65 
 
The diffusion of personal computer technology, enabled by reduced 
cost and technological advances, has turned cyberspace into a more 
software-centric environment. In other words, whereas purchasing 
hardware constituted a significant threshold for entry into cyberspace 
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before, that threshold is now significantly lower. Developing malware 
is mostly an issue of finding vulnerabilities and programming effec-
tive exploits—which can be done with regular laptops. There are three 
caveats to this observation. First, while expensive hardware might not 
be necessary to perform most tasks, the need for brain power (i.e., 
human capital) is so central to CNO that it constitutes a significant 
requirement for cyber power—a requirement that is based on a limited 
resource. Recruiting competent individuals is a problem for both the 
public and private sector, because increase in demand is outstripping 
the supply of IT professionals in general, and cyber security experts 
specifically.66 Moreover, there are a limited number of individuals 
who can do the sophisticated kind of programming necessary for 
malware such as Stuxnet or Flame. Second, hardware is not irrelevant, 
as some CNOs necessitate access to significant computing power to 
perform complex tasks.67 Nye mentions several technological trends 
that favor powerful states. “Space-based sensors, direct broadcasting, 
high-speed computers, and complex software provide the ability to 
gather, sort, process, transfer, and disseminate information about 
complex events that occur over wide geographic areas. This network-
ing of military systems produces a powerful advantage (as well as a 
potential vulnerability).”68 Third, some CNOs require assets outside 
cyberspace, such as intelligence, to target or gain access to certain 
networks. As mentioned earlier, the Stuxnet operation was made pos-
sible by jumping the air gap. This can be done with an agent or by 
planting malware on equipment used by an unknowing insider. Fur-
thermore, the development of Stuxnet necessitated access to the phys-
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ical infrastructure used at Natanz, specifically the centrifuges, to test 
out and properly calibrate the malware.69 
 
All three caveats impose limitations on which actors can do what. The 
lack of human capital is a supply problem that affects states’ potential 
abilities to conduct large and complex operations. For states, over-
coming this problem requires investing in education, as they cannot 
simply poach talent from other states, and this is a long process. While 
the supply issue does not appear to significantly hamper states at the 
present time, it is not unrealistic to assume that the demand will in-
crease as cyber operations gain more relevance in military operations. 
Foreseeing this issue, many states, including potentially hostile actors, 
are investing heavily in education and in the training of cyber security 
experts.70 The necessity for hardware in some operations is unlikely to 
prove an obstacle to most states, but it is a caveat on Nye’s “diffusion 
of power” concept, as non-state actors might find it difficult to acquire 
or gain access to significant ICT infrastructure. Intelligence and other 
resources outside cyberspace also favor states, and especially states 
with significant intelligence and covert operations capabilities. In sum, 
the barrier to entry in cyberspace is lower relative to other domains, 
but the requirements for certain resources still favor states when it 
comes to complex operations. 
 
A second security implication of the software-centric nature of cyber-
space is the ease with which malware and methods of exploitation can 
spread. Similarly to the diffusion of hardware technology, the prolif-
eration of software means a leveling of the playing field. The distinc-
tion between the two phenomena is that malware proliferation has 
more direct and specific effects. Whereas hardware diffusion is a 
long-term process that affects the power balance, malware prolifera-
tion in most cases means the spread of a specific tool designed for a 
specific, and often limited, purpose. The spread of such tools therefore 
has little strategic impact, because once an exploit has been used, the 
vulnerability can be detected and fixed.71 The more serious security 
implication of proliferation occurs when these tools are reengineered 
for broader or different purposes. Such is the fear with Stuxnet, as 
parts or translations of its source code have been made public on the 
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Internet, which can then be redesigned for other targets.72 The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security said in a congressional testimony 
in 2011 that “attackers could use the increasingly public information 
about [Stuxnet] to develop variants targeted at broader installations of 
programmable equipment in control systems.”73 
 
Given these developments, the diffusion of technology in relation to 
cyber security has significant security implications. It can potentially 
affect the power balance between states, enable greater participation 
by non-state actors and make it easier for belligerent actors to launch 
attacks on other actors. However, the caveats discussed earlier indi-
cate that states, and particularly powerful states, are still favored in 
cyberspace.74 While smaller states can repurpose part of the Stuxnet 
code to launch attacks against U.S. critical national infrastructure, they 
will probably lack the intelligence capacity to launch accurate attacks 
and the human resources needed to sustain a prolonged campaign.75 
These are significant hurdles and would suggest that after a certain 
point (somewhere after DDoS attacks and simple CNE), the complexi-
ty of an operation or campaign is proportional to a state’s traditional 
power. However, this proposition needs to be further tested as there is 
currently insufficient data on state cyber warfare. 
Measuring the model 
The defining characteristics suggest what hostile actions are possible, 
practical and effective. Malleability means a wide range of targets to 
attack, so a state would pursue new or unknown vulnerabilities to sur-
prise its opponent. We have already seen some examples of simplistic 
CNAs, such as North Korean DDoS attacks on South Korea and Rus-
sia’s alleged DDoS attacks on Estonian and Georgian websites in 
2007 and 2008, respectively.76 These are relatively crude operations 
aimed at disrupting communications, and as such the threshold for 
conducting them might be relatively low. 
 
More advanced operations would likely manifest themselves in attacks 
on critical national infrastructure, such as power grids, stock exchang-
es and telecom infrastructure. The difference is that while DDoS at-
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tacks merely floods servers with requests to suspend ICT service, 
these operations involve infiltrating networks and creating major dis-
ruption and possibly degradation or destruction outside cyberspace. 
As of today there are no known incidents of states launching such at-
tacks on CNI, though states are developing the capability and capacity 
for complex offensive operations. Stuxnet showed that critical infra-
structure attacks are possible, and there have been other, though 
smaller, examples of attacks or so-called proofs of concepts of attacks 
on critical national infrastructure.77 Yet the details of the Stuxnet op-
eration reveal the challenges of implementing such operations. 
 
The challenge of attributing actions to actors, enabled by the mallea-
bility and networked nature of cyberspace, would suggest a low 
threshold for malicious activity, but given the uncertain accuracy and 
effects of attacks, not to mention the single-shot nature of most tools, 
it is more likely that states would be hesitant about launching attacks. 
These factors, combined with increased vulnerabilities leaving infor-
mation available through cyberspace, suggest that states would be 
more inclined to use their cyber resources on espionage, at least in 
peacetime. This is largely the picture of cyber security today. While 
states worry about the potential threat against CNI, cyber security to-
day, on a state level, is almost entirely about espionage. A list of all 
major cyber incidents since 2006 shows that the vast majority of inci-
dents are CNE operations.78 The targets range from governments to 
corporations, with some operations including a mixture of both. The 
information gathered may vary greatly, but they mostly appear to be 
of strategic purpose, as would be expected during peacetime, and not 
for immediate operational utility. These campaigns have gathered in-
formation about state secrets and military technology (Byzantine 
Hades), corporate secrets, or both (Operation Shady RAT).79 Infor-
mation about dissidents has also been a part of at least one campaign, 
Operation Aurora.80 Other campaigns appear to be part of reconnais-
sance operations, for instance Duqu and Flame. Both malwares appear 
to be designed for gathering information in the Middle East. Duqu, the 
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oldest of the two, arguably shares similarities with Stuxnet, and thus 
might have related purposes in regards to the Iranian nuclear pro-
gram.81 According to some reports, Flame, discovered in 2012, is also 
aimed at Iran, designed to gather information in preparation for cyber 
sabotage.82 
 
In regards to attribution, it should be noted that behavior during war, 
or intensified conflict, could be different. Signaling would be a signif-
icant motivation for launching attacks during a declared conflict, mak-
ing the possibility of plausible deniability largely irrelevant. Opera-
tions like Stuxnet and Duqu are likely to be part of operations during 
or leading up to conflict, given their operational value, while cam-
paigns such as Byzantine Hades and Operation Shady Rat have more 
long-term, and possibly economic, aims. 
 
Regarding how the collapse of distance and time affects offensive be-
havior, it would be reasonable to expect that states would utilize cyber 
attacks to achieve a form of first-move advantage. Given the single-
shot nature of cyber weapons, however, states could be hesitant about 
using their tools and exposing their capabilities. We have seen exam-
ples of both. During both the Estonian-Russian conflict in 2007 and 
the Georgian-Russian war in 2008, the Russian government or its 
agents allegedly launched DDoS attacks to paralyze communications 
in the target countries. In the case of the former, Russia appears to 
have used the attacks to coerce the Estonian government into revers-
ing its decision regarding the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn statue.83 The 
cyber attacks on Georgia were part of a military campaign, attempting 
to disrupt communications, albeit in limited ways, during fighting.84 
However, the operational value of the attacks was quite small as 
Georgian authorities were able to reroute traffic and move servers 
abroad, evidencing both the resilience of the networked space and the 
inefficiency of blunt tools such as DDoS. 
 
From an offensive perspective, diffusion of technology should not 
have significant influence on state behavior. It may enable more states 
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to conduct CNOs, thus increasing the risk of retaliation in cyberspace, 
but it is unclear whether moderate cyber capabilities in smaller states 
would successfully deter more powerful ones from attacking them.  
 
Implications 
The defining characteristics of cyberspace suggest a picture of conflict 
that closely resembles what has been seen in the past decade. There 
have been few attacks, and most malicious activity is espionage. What 
little attacks have happened in war or intense conflict have either been 
of entirely auxiliary nature (Estonia, Georgia), harassment (Korea) or 
simple sabotage as part of a covert operation (Stuxnet). In fact, some 
of the most telling examples of cyber conflict have been those that did 
not happen. The decision not to attack the Iraqi bank system in 2003 
illustrates how hard it is to contain the effects of attacks, while the de-
cision not to use cyber warfare in Libya reveals a hesitance on the part 
of the United States to show its hand.85  
 
If this model and its construction is sound, the defining characteristics 
and their security implications indicate how actors might leverage cy-
berspace to achieve political goals, and thus describe the mechanics 
underpinning compulsory cyber power. The model illustrates the pos-
sibilities of cyber operations, but perhaps more so their limitations. 
While concluding would be premature, the findings presented here 
suggest that states have limited coercive power in cyberspace. In the 
same way that strategic bombing and sea blockades have only limited 
utility by themselves, cyber operations alone cannot be decisive in war 
because they cannot dislodge an opponent or accumulate territory or 
material assets. In other words, they do not challenge the primacy of 
land power.86 
 
Others have reached similar conclusions, but there are flaws in the 
traditionalist arguments. Thomas Rid argues that cyberspace is not 
used for warfare, but sabotage, espionage and subversion.87 The as-
sumption is that cyberspace holds little potential for large-scale dam-
age, and thus coercion. The focus on violence by critics of the cyber 
hype is a conceptual issue that can be debated. However, the empirical 
approach has shortcomings. There is simply not enough data on the 
strategic utility of cyberspace, rendering any conclusion over cyber 
power incomplete. In addition, the malleability of cyberspace ensures 
that the environment does not remain static. In other words, while the 
model presented here also accentuates the limits of cyber power, it  
                                                 
85  Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Debated Cyberwarfare Against Libya,” New York 
Times, October 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyber-
warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html?_r=2. 
86  John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2001), chap. 4. 
87  Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place.” 
36 Hans-Inge Langø 
acknowledges that it is not static either. A change in any of the defin-
ing characteristics might change the utility of cyberspace, though its 
malleability is probably the most important. Changes in dependency 
and actors’ ability to exploit those accompanying vulnerabilities can 
significantly alter the coercive potential. Similarly, improvements in 
attributing hostile actions to actors, a wicked problem in cyber securi-
ty today, could mean increased relevance for deterrence and coercion 
theory. What seems difficult today might be entirely plausible in the 
future. Only time will tell. 
 
If the structural restraints further decrease the coercive potential of 
cyberspace, perhaps other forms of cyber power are more potent. Da-
vid J. Betz and Tim Stevens’ conceptualization of productive cyber 
power, meaning the ability to create and disseminate ideas and affect 
discourse, can offer significant cognitive effects usable for states.88 
Similarly, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s concept of netwar, or 
cultural conflict on a societal level using cyber tools, was much more 
conceptual than policy-prescription when it was written, but the idea 
offers other avenues for gaining influence or affecting political or stra-
tegic change.89 Netwar and similar concepts of information warfare 
should be further studied. Only then will a more detailed picture of 
cyber power emerge. 
Future research 
When discussing cyber security, the discussion is usually focused on 
possibilities. The questions of how one can be attacked and how one 
can attack usually form the focal points of the debate. These are im-
portant questions, but any discussion of ‘how’ is meaningless without 
answering the ‘why’. While it is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
political context of cyber conflict is vital to the understanding of cyber 
security. For instance, power diffusion suggests some implications for 
operational cyber power, such as more actors being able to execute 
certain operations in cyberspace, but the strategic implications for 
cyber power are more unclear. Even if smaller states or non-state ac-
tors should circumvent the resource requirements outlined above, 
there is still the risk of escalation. Any operation conducted against a 
more powerful opponent would have to be executed in a way that 
avoids the risk of escalation into kinetic war or significant diplomatic 
or economic sanctions. States wishing to conduct such operations 
would have to anticipate  with a high degree of certainty the opposing 
state’s reaction to such events. In other words, the diffusion of power 
in cyberspace does not suspend the laws of Clausewitz. Malicious ac-
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tivity will happen in a political context, whether the attacking actor 
intends this or not, and runs the risk of retaliation. Corporations do not 
start wars, and states do not purposefully ignore their own survival. 
 
Therefore, developments in cyber security should be further discussed 
in the context of existing international relations theories. The implica-
tions the information revolution has had and will continue to have on 
international security remain largely unexplored, but there are clearly 
relevant questions to be asked. One obvious question is whether the 
development of more sophisticated cyber weapons and continued so-
cietal vulnerability related to cyberspace will increase the risk of in-
ternational conflict.  This is not to say that cyberspace will create nec-
essarily conflict, but proliferation and digital arms races can trigger 
escalation in diplomatic conflicts or cause security dilemmas. Propo-
nents of offense-defense theory would perhaps contend that cyber 
weapons can have this effect, given their general offense-dominance, 
but recent work by Keir Lieber would suggest that this would not be 
the case.90  
 
Related to this is the question of posture and policy-formulation. This 
paper has not directly addressed the issue of actors’ threat perception, 
but an informal reading of many states’ strategies in cyberspace sug-
gests that there is a disconnect between what the model presented here 
suggests about cyber conflict and what states are preparing for in cy-
berspace. This gap can be explained by a flawed understanding of cy-
berspace as a strategic ecological system, or it can be the result of 
threat inflation. Constructivists and securitization scholars have done 
some work already on the formulation of cyber policy and threat infla-
tion, but much work remains.91 Examining how states perceive threats 
in and through cyberspace can inform our understanding of cyber se-
curity, but it also offers direct policy relevance. Like with warnings of 
a “cyber Pearl Harbor,” too much of the discourse on cyber security is 
rooted in science fiction rather than fact. As Martin C. Libicki wrote 
in 1995, “Because to judge what otherwise sober analysts choose to 
include as information warfare—such as hacker warfare or esoteric 
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versions of psychological warfare—the range of what can be included 
in its definition is hardly limited by reality..”92 
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